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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses ways in which theorizing gender may be important in forming an understanding of the
topic of emancipation which is central to the new critical information systems based on Habermas’s
thinking. After briefly introducing current research on gender and IS and arguing that we need to look
towards feminist philosophy for appropriate theory in order to understand foundational issues such as
emancipation, the paper reflects on the reasons why technical disciplines may find feminist theory
threatening. The development of feminist philosophy and epistemology is introduced. Habermas’s ‘ideal
speech situation’ is problematized in relation to feminist writing on male and female communication
juxtaposed with recent research in computer mediated communications. The paper continues by exploring
the concept of emancipation through feminist epistemology and closes by analysing how these concerns may
be applied to critical IS.

1.

INTRODUCTION

There is much evidence to suggest that gender is a fundamental, and possibly even the most fundamental
aspect of the way we organize and categorize our social existence [Evans, 1994]. The first thing we are told
about a baby when it is born is whether it is a boy or girl. We are often thrown off guard if someone of the
‘wrong’ gender appears in a given role. We phone Professor Smith and her secretary, Mr Brown, answers the
call. Someone who feels like man trapped in a woman’s body, or a woman trapped in a male body may go to
extreme lengths to change sex. Leaving aside procreation and potential fleshly pleasures, there is no doubt
that gender, and ordering the world along gendered lines, matters a great deal to us. Yet, given that it is
accepted alongside class, and ethnicity, and even age, sexuality and religion, as an important determinant of
social behaviour in research in the social sciences, it rarely appears in the ‘technical’ disciplines as a research
topic.
This paper briefly reviews current research on gender and information systems, both from within a tradition
of writing on gender and information technologies and from within IS, to conclude that, so far, little has been
written on gender aspects of more foundational issues in IS as the concept of ‘gender’ itself has remained
under-theorized. I reflect on why feminist theory may hitherto have appeared threatening to technical
disciplines. It is suggested that feminist theory, feminist philosophy and, within that, feminist epistemology,
may be a fruitful starting place to analyze the problematic concept of emancipation which has been imported
into critical IS through the work of Habermas. Habermas’s [1972] theory of knowledge-constitutive interests
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is a critique of epistemology which questions the validity of our knowledge of the world. The concept of
emancipation is crucially linked to epistemology through the ideal of emancipatory interests overcoming
technocracy. Yet feminist writers [Meehan 1995] have criticized Habermas for his tendency to universalize
and the gender-blindness of his work. The paper analyzes associated problems through, first of all,
considering the ‘ideal speech situation’ of communicative rationality which has proved an appealing idea in
critical IS and linking this to recent research in computer mediated communications (CMC). Secondly,
arguments from feminist epistemology are adduced to contend, in more detail, that, until the fine structure of
emancipation is better understood, attempts to emancipate may not achieve their ends. Finally these
arguments are applied to critical IS.
1.1.

Gender and IS from Gender and IT

Although there has been a widespread turn towards treating social and organizational issues as important and
legitimate areas for IS research, work which has specifically addressed gender as a research variable has
remained limited in scope and in quantity within the IS domain. At the same time, it is interesting to note that
feminist research on information systems has dwindled from a high point in the late 1980s and early 1990s
where a number of reasonably high profile projects were funded and reported in the literature [Green, 1994;
Green et al, 1993; Bjerkenes and Bratteteig, 1987; Vehvilainen, 1997]. Although there appears to be just as
much interest on gender and information and communication technologies as ever, this implies that the
‘gender equity’ inspired empirical research project in IS seems to have all but disappeared.
One problem is that this type of research appears to have lost momentum as research on gender and virtuality
and the Internet has overtaken earlier workplace studies. But it should be pointed out that, at the same time,
the projects listed above were all but ignored by the IS mainstream. For instance, although the FLORENCE
project was reported in a widely cited edited collection [Bjerknes et al., 1987] I have found only one citation
of FLORENCE itself in a major IS publication [Hirschheim et al., 1995].
Clearly this area of research does not fit into to mainstream IS as such, belonging instead to a more specific
‘gender and information technologies’ research community. Nevertheless the seeming failure of gender and
IS as a research paradigm, within this apparently very relevant sub-community, further adds to the feeling
that gender and IS research is in the doldrums and a failure to get anywhere near the mainstream may have
contributed the apparent atrophy of this paradigm of research.
1.2.

Gender and IS from IS

Research on gender and IS from within the more broadly defined ‘gender and IT’ community can be
compared in style to the much more slender body of quantitative and qualitative research on gender and IS
which is located and reported in the IS literature. The problem with research on gender and IS from with IS
itself is somewhat different. Apart from the fact that there is not very much of it, I argue that, currently,
much of this work is under-theorized with regard to the concept of gender itself. Quantitative research
revolving round statistical surveys which look for differences in men’s and women’s behaviours, tends to
force men’s and women’s characteristics into stereotyped straitjackets [Gefen and Straub, 1997; Igbaria and
Chidambaram, 1997; Truman and Baroudi, 1994; Venkatesh and Morris, 2000 ].
On the other hand, although there are exceptions [Wilson and Howcroft, 2000], qualitative, or, perhaps more
properly, non-statistical research on gender and IS tends to focus on the low numbers of women in the
profession and how to attract more of them [Camp, 1997; Panteli et al, 1999; Robertson et al., 1999]. Camp’s
[1997] notion of ‘shrinking pipelines’ captures the mood of such work well. Whilst low numbers of women
continues to be a problem, it is much harder to tackle the question of why information technology is
unappealing to women in the first place. Last year’s ECIS conference panel on gender was possibly one of
the very few mainstream appearances of the topic ever, but this does not represent a major project in the area
[Robertson et al., 1999].
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1.3.

Feminist Theory – Why is It Threatening?

Reviewing gender and IS research from within the IS discipline itself, points to the conclusion that this area
needs to be informed by a more thoroughgoing theoretical perspective and, in particular, a perspective which
places gender centre stage as an analytical category. One place to look for such a perspective is academic
feminism, which has been a tremendous academic growth area in the last twenty or more years. But
understandably most ‘technical’ and mainstream disciplines shy away from feminist writing. It is not
difficult to see why. Put bluntly, but without intending to universalize the experiences of women, feminist
writing starts from the base point that women generally stand in an inferior position to men in most walks of
life. Whilst analyzing and reporting, at the same time much feminist research looks to ways in which such
situations might be alleviated. It is therefore a political project. Not surprisingly this can be seen as
threatening, particularly for areas such as IS, which subscribes to a rhetoric that, as a relatively new
discipline, it may have escaped old discriminatory practices prevalent in longer established domains [Truman
and Baroudi, 1994]. A dimension to this potential threat is that if women are the oppressed then it could be
argued that men are the oppressors.
Not surprisingly such a position would seem threatening to say the least. Nevertheless this is not a position
which is generally held in contemporary feminism which eschews such a stark and unanalyzed view of the
many facets of oppression. Here I am attempting to present the extremes of the argument to find reasons why
feminist thinking often appears threatening to mainstream writing. Indeed, as I suggest above, the stereotypes
promulgated by a major strand of gender and IS writing i.e. statistical gender difference studies, are just as
oppressive to men as to women. Therefore it would seem to be in everyone’s interests that gender relations
are thoroughly explored and then couched in an appropriate theoretical framework.
1.4.

Addressing ‘Non Gender’ Topics in IS with Feminist Theory

It would be easy to view the ‘pipeline’ style and statistical research reported above as the acceptable face of
feminism, where figures and statistics can be endlessly analyzed, thus postponing the requirement to look at
deeper, underlying reasons for women’s absence from technical disciplines.
The question of relative absence remains important and must not be dismissed. Yet, if we were to believe
that the only contribution that feminist theory can make to IS is at the ‘equal opportunities’, human resources
end of the subject then we would be missing out on its potential to contribute significantly to the critical,
analytical end of the IS spectrum. A further, and equally important task for feminist theory in the service of
IS involves combining the lessons learned from the diverse literature on gender and information technologies
with relevant aspects of feminist philosophy and bring all these to a discussion of the development of the
theory of IS.
This means that a more radical job for feminist theory would be to see if it could contribute to debates
fermenting round important topics in IS which have hitherto hardly been seen in gendered terms at all
[Adam, 2001; Adam and Richardson, 2001]. The rest of the paper addresses the latter area, namely a
contemporary, apparently ‘non-gender’ topic (i.e. not, on the surface related to masculinity and femininity)
from the point of view of various aspects of feminist theory.
The topic in question is the emancipatory vector of critical IS in its basis on Habermas’s writing. The
following sections bring a critique and analysis of Habermas’s writing, developed from feminist philosophy,
to bear on the important topic of emancipation. Critical IS has appropriated the term ‘emancipation’ based on
its adoption of an anti-positivist position based on Habermas’s critical theory. Although it might be tempting
to regard the concept of emancipation as purely beneficial, I argue that a better understanding of the
implications of this term can be made through a feminist analysis to show that we need a much more
sophisticated understanding of the fine structure of emancipation. This shows that attempts to universalize
the concept are problematic. In particular I draw on feminist critiques of Habermas’s writing [Benhabib,
1986; Meehan, 1995] to argue that, just as feminist writers have criticized Habermas’s theories as being
gender blind, there is a danger that this ‘gender blindness’, with its concomitant problems, may be imported
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by critical IS in its adherence to Habermas’s critical theory. In what follows I will argue, in particular, that
the concept of ‘emancipation’ is problematic and that calls for emancipation may actually mask existing
power structures and hence reinforce them, offering little scope for true emancipation.

2.

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND EPISTEMOLOGY – A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION

Space permits no more than the briefest introduction to feminist theory through feminist philosophy which I
have argued can provide a fruitful perspective from which to analyze contemporary issues in the foundations
of IS, and in particular crucial concepts in critical IS. Feminist philosophy is one of the most theoretically
developed parts of contemporary feminism and at the same time is one of the most important developments
in contemporary philosophy, particularly at the radical end of the discipline [Tong, 1994]. It has two major
roles; firstly to form a critique of mainstream philosophy and secondly to offer alternative theoretical
positions, ones which often rest on feminine inspired attributes such as intuition, collective responsibility and
fairness rather than what are often perceived as masculine norms of individual rights and rationality. Since
World War Two it has developed two distinctive branches, Continental or what is sometimes termed
‘postmodern’ feminism and Anglo-American feminism [Hekman, 1990].
Anglo-American feminism originated from the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s within which
the struggle for women's liberation was prominent. Equal rights, equality, power struggles, inclusion,
emancipation, liberation –these are all terms which inspire this strand of feminism. Hence the foundations of
this strand of feminist thinking belong more to the fight for women’s equality with men than within
postmodern feminism’s challenge to the rational order which men have apparently created. Within feminist
philosophy itself the two largest branches are feminist epistemology [Tong, 1993] and feminist ethics [Card,
1991]. Feminist epistemology challenges traditional epistemology’s propensity to ignore the knowing subject
and the contingency of knowledge. Feminist ethics challenges traditional ethical theories, particularly in
their tendency to focus on the individual rational moral agent at the expense of more collectivist approaches
towards moral theory. Both feminist epistemology and feminist ethics have a bearing on the critique of
Habermas’s view of epistemology and ethics. However, for reasons of brevity it is a more general
introduction to a feminist critique of critical IS through some aspects of feminist epistemology which is
introduced below.
Although I do not have space to rehearse the arguments in detail here, it must be emphasized that
contemporary feminist writing argues strongly against tendencies to universalize women’s experiences. For
instance, early second wave ‘women’s liberation’ was later criticized as being a white, Western middle class
feminism of limited relevance to women of non-white and/or working class origins.
At a time when new IS writing is beginning to locate itself within critical theory, and where IS developing a
distinct critical voice, feminist philosophy as an alternative major contemporary critical theory may offer an
alternative critical approach. Secondly, in following the history of IS’s turn to critical theory, it is clear that
power, emancipation, participation, democracy and inclusion are concepts which inspire contemporary IS
writers and these too are central concepts of feminist theories.

3.

THE CRITICAL APPROACH TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The relatively new critical theory school in IS associated with Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen [1995: 1996;
see especially Hirschheim, 1985] amongst others, looks to the social theories of Habermas in arguing for
communicative rationality as an alternative to the instrumental rationality of positivism. As technical
knowledge interests have come to dominate society through ‘technocracy’ i.e. expertise supported through a
positivist view of science, critical debate, through communicative competence is required. Within this new
anti-positivist approach there lies the possibility to free individuals from oppressive and unwarranted
expressions of power – the emancipatory ideal. If such ideas can be translated into the design and
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development real information systems then the systems analyst can act as emancipator rather than someone
who imposes a technicist solution on a group of unwilling users.
3.1.

Feminist Philosophy and Emancipation

The concept of emancipation is a central part of the epistemology of the new critical IS. Yet, the power
structures which play such a large part in the making and acceptance of knowledge need more detailed
analysis than is currently available within the new IS approaches.
The will for a generalized unanalyzed emancipation is not enough; indeed it may serve to reinforce rather
than alleviate oppression if it leaves unexplored the material conditions which cause the oppression in the
first place. This version of emancipation leans toward a form of liberalism which is unlikely to achieve its
ideals unless we direct attention towards more detailed analysis of power relations within organizations and
the wider society which make emancipation seem so desirable in the first place. Indeed the power relations
will remain unbalanced if the systems designers cast themselves as the liberators or emancipators, with a
privileged epistemology based on the new critical IS, storming the barricades of ignorance in emancipating
the system users who maybe did not even realize that they were candidates for emancipation.
Feminist philosophers such as Assiter [1996], Haraway [1991] and Harding [1991] emphasize pluralism in
epistemology. They argue that a viewpoint from an epistemic community committed to emancipatory values
gives greater access to knowledge, by bringing to light information previously hidden from view, than
viewpoints from other types of community. The implications of this claim are explored in the remainder of
the paper.
3.2.

A feminist Critique of Communicative Rationality

It is this tendency to universalize human experience and thereby to assume that democracy and liberation are
the same for everyone that has been a particular focus of feminist critiques of Habermas [Meehan, 1995].
Habermas would like a universal moral theory yet feminist moral theorists [e.g. Code, 1993] argue for the
cultural specificity of ethical theory and argue that all ethical decision makers are not equally placed to
contribute to ethical decision making. Critical theory suggests that increased communicative rationality leads
to increased opportunity for emancipation yet many feminist linguists argue that speech situations for women
may be far from ideal. For instance Spender’s [1980] research shows that women are interrupted more than
men in public discourse. Despite popular conceptions of women’s ‘chattering’, Spender argues that men
contribute more than women in public meetings and that women who take up the same time as men in
speaking publicly are seen as ‘overcontributing.’ Similarly Tannen [1992] argues that women and men have
different speech styles; women are often more supportive in conversation; men are often more abrupt.
These concerns have been taken up in the rhetoric surrounding CMC, particularly in writing which idealizes
the utopian potential of the Internet to act as an instrument of communicative rationality for an ideal speech
situation [Sproull and Kessler, 1991]. Ess [1996] emphasizes that unanalyzed claims as to what is meant by
democracy tend to weaken claims for the Internet’s potential to achieve a democratic polity along the lines
that Habermas outlined in his critical theory. This mirrors the position taken in the present paper that an
undertheorized notion of emancipation cannot be pressed into service for all groups who might require it.
Herring [1996] points to the way in which communications on the Internet magnify stereotypical male and
female interaction into flaming and supportive interaction respectively, rather than somehow smoothing it
out and making all voices equally heard. Sexual harassment on the Internet is problematic enough but
extreme versions, in the form of ‘cyberstalking’ can result [Adam, 2001]. In the end Ess [1996] realizes that
democratization via CMC along ethical and political dimensions cannot take place without attention to
ethical and social aspects to include under-represented voices such as those of women and minorities.
This short discussion barely scratches the surface of the subtleties of male and female communicative
interaction. Yet unless there is some understanding of its complexities it is hard to see how communicative
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rationality, through an ‘ideal speech situation’, in the world of information systems can be achieved until we
accept that ideal speech situations are not the same for all, and until more complex analyses are available of
the ways in which concepts such as democracy and emancipation are not equally divided.

4.

EXPLORING FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
EMANCIPATORY VALUES

Thinking about the potential for feminist philosophy to analyze the fine structure of the problem of
emancipation, feminist epistemology may be particularly pertinent. Assiter’s [1996] arguments are important
in this respect. She claims that the major value of feminist epistemology is in its questioning of the ways in
which traditional theories of knowledge regard the business of knowing as independent of social and cultural
context. By contrast, a feminist approach argues for a situated understanding of knowledge. Yet the realist
element must not be lost as it is vital to recognize the reality of the oppression of various social groups. A
completely relativist approach, which is a danger if we go too far in completely rejecting positivism, has no
way to recognize the reality of oppression and therefore the will towards emancipation is fatally undermined.
What is the link between emancipatory values and knowledge? Some feminist writers have particularly
emphasized the way that taking seriously the viewpoint of subjugated groups, in expressing their will
towards emancipation, may be taken to open up new forms of knowledge. Haraway [1991] and Harding
[1991] argue that a standpoint taken from women’s lives, and a commitment towards emancipatory values
for women leads to more knowledge, adding a dimension to knowledge which is hidden from the viewpoint
of a ‘value free’ abstract science. For instance, witness the way that the discovery of the importance of
‘woman the gatherer’ in addition to ‘man the hunter’ has changed our view of our evolutionary history.
Secondly, Gilligan’s [1982] research on women’s moral evolution has challenged earlier views that women
were morally less mature than men, thus changing our views of moral development.
So it seems that writers on feminist epistemology are in agreement with Habermas that the model of a good
science (e.g. in this case information systems) should be guided by liberatory, social goals and interests and a
commitment to such goals reveals gaps, continuities and partialities in traditional accounts of knowledge.
This aspect of revealing the hidden is particularly important in feminist thinking. Repressive values can
blinker this. Those who are committed to the emancipation of a particular group may offer us radical insights
into the world which may of value to others, not just those in that chosen group. Knowledge can advance, in
this way, by a window onto new truths. However, in following such a process, we cannot claim that
emancipatory values always lead to knowledge, rather that the possibilities for new knowledge are opened
up.
Haraway [1991] and Harding [1991] argue that those who are in a ‘subaltern’ position excluded from
dominant groups, for instance women, are in a better position to articulate emancipatory values which will
ultimately lead to knowledge. This echoes older Marxist thinking which looks to the proletariat for a truer
picture of the world. Yet the feminist position makes no truth claims, rather it is arguing for the knowledge
of oppressed groups to be taken seriously to be seen as on a par with the knowledge of other groups.
Although in agreement with Habermas in some aspects this seems to cut across his attempts to universalize.
Seeing emancipation as part of everyday relations, he argues, at the same time, that it reaffirms common
humanity through universality [Benhabib, 1986]. The point about the feminist argument is not that we should
lose sight of common humanity, which is the universal aspect which we share, but rather that we must
recognize how a pluralism of epistemological understanding contributes to this common humanity.

5.

CONCLUSION – HOW CAN FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY SERVE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS?

It is not immediately clear how critiques of Habermas, and in particular, the problem of emancipation, can
have a practical bearing on critical IS. Nevertheless there are ways in which these concepts can offer lessons.
First of all they imply that attention to social and cultural context is paramount. This serves to underline IS’s
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commitment to position itself within the social/cultural arena, in contrast to the more formal stance of
traditional computer science. Secondly, feminist theory’s calls to retain realism with emancipation are in
accord with current approaches to IS, where unbridled relativism seems impossible to maintain alongside
calls for emancipation. These two aspects are already part of the rationale of much writing in IS. But a
particular emphasis stems from the third message from feminist epistemology, relating to Haraway’s [1991]
Harding’s [1991] emphasis of the knowledge of subordinate groups in developing their own approaches
towards their emancipation. Applying this to IS reveals at least two aspects. Communicative rationality
through ‘ideal speech situations’ as described above, may be quite differently construed within a subordinate
group. Secondly, this specifically challenges the whole notion of the systems analyst as emancipator. It
suggests further that managers, systems analysts and those in high positions in the organizational hierarchy
cannot easily achieve emancipation of workers lower in the hierarchy. Rather we must look to the
subordinate groups themselves for an expression of their own emancipatory values through their own
knowledges. This is a much stronger claim than the more liberally inspired ‘user participative’ approaches
often found in IS. The way forward would seem to be a return to the ‘feminist theory’ inspired IS projects
described at the beginning of this paper, to take seriously the idea that feminist theory can inform the critical
approach to IS, and to explore this in a more thorough way than can be accomplished within this space, and
finally to provide practical demonstrations of how this may be achieved.
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